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cases, seems to be a growing and continuing trend. The conclusions of
the Teramano case were preceded by the Illinois court's decision in the
Nudd case,34 which rejected Parental Immunity as to wanton and wilful
torts. The court succinctly stated that
[w]hile this policy might be such justification to prevent suits for mere negligence within the scope of the parental relationship we do not conceive that
public policy should prevent a minor from obtaining redress for wilful and
wanton misconduct on the part of a parent.8 5
In view of such statements it is inevitable that the doctrine of Parental
Immunity will eventually disappear and be replaced by a more appropriate
doctrine which imposes Parental Liability in all cases except those involving ordinary negligence.8 6
Melvin Rishe
84

Supra note 32.

35 Supra note 32 at 619, 131 N.E.2d at 531 (1956).
86

The apparent trend to allow minors to recover against their parents for injuries
sustained through wanton torts or while the parent is engaged in a business activity
indicates that "Parental Immunity" is too inclusive a term. "Parental Liability except

in ordinary negligence cases" would be a more accurate and descriptive title for this
tort area.

TORTS-STRICT LIABILITY-PRIVITY AS A DEFENSE
FOR A NON-NEGLIGENT MANUFACTURER
On February 11, 1957, Messrs. Suvada and Konecnik purchased a reconditioned tractor-trailer from White Motor Company. The unit was
equipped with a braking system manufactured by co-defendant, Bendix.
On June 24, 1960, while plaintiffs' agent was driving the tractor, the
brake system failed due to a defective component part and the tractor
collided with a passenger bus, causing personal injuries to several passengers and damaging the bus and plaintiffs' tractor-trailer. The plaintiffs
were compelled to pay personal injury claims to the injured bus passengers,
the cost of repairs to the bus, and the repairs on their tractor unit. Subsequently, they filed an indemnity suit against the defendants, predicating
liability on the grounds of negligence and breach of implied warranty.
The trial court sustained Bendix's motion to strike the warranty count
upon the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege privity of contract.
On plaintiffs' appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court held that plaintiff's had
stated causes of action against defendants and reversed the trial court.'
1 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 111. App.2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313 (1964).
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Bendix Corporation appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which decided
for the plaintiffs on the theory that the defendants were strictly liable in
tort. The court emprasized that privity of contract is not a prerequisite
to bringing such an action. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210
N.E.2d 182 (1965).
Whether a non-negligent manufacturer who places in the stream of
commerce a dangerous and defective product, can insulate himself from
liability by invoking the defense of privity of contract is the precise issue
2
presented to the court.
The decision in Suvada exemplifies a continued and persistent "assault
upon the citadel ' 3 of privity since its inception in Winterbottom v.
Wright.4 The general rule derived from the Winterbottom decision was
that no action could lie, in tort or contract, unless privity was present.
Inevitably, exceptions to the requirement of privity in actions based on
common law negligence developed," and as a result of the much celebrated case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,6 the privity requirement
7
in tort actions was no longer necessary.
The traditional proposition that privity of contract is indispensable to
recovery against the manufacturer or seller of a product which has caused
injury where the defendant's breach of an express or implied warranty is
2 There were ancillary issues presented to the court for adjudication, but these issues
were not concerned with the doctrine of privity and received only brief comment
by the court.
3Taken from an article of that name: Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
4 10 Mees. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), where the court, in holding that a
third party could not maintain an action against the manufacturer of a mail-coach
for injuries sustained due to the defective construction of the coach because the parties
were not in privity, stated: ". . . if we allow this action it might be the means of letting
in upon us an infinity of actions."
5 The principal exceptions were: (a) Levy v. Langridge, 2 Mees. & W. 519, 150
Eng. Rep. 1458 (1838), wherein a seller who knows that a product is dangerous for its
intended use, fails to disclose this fact to the buyer and a third person is injured by
such use; (b) Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852), where the
article was "imminently" or "inherently" dangerous to human life or safety; (c)
Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N.Y. 124, 15 A.R. 387 (1874), where the defective
product was furnished by the defendant for use on his land and the one injured was
invited on the land by defendant to use the defective product.
6217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

7 See Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 NE.2d 693, (1946), where the court
stated, "[tjhe MacPherson case caused the exception to swallow the asserted rule of
non-liability leaving nothing upon which that rule could operate. Wherever that case
is accepted, that rule in truth is abolished and ceases to be part of the law." (ld. at 103,
64 N.E.2d at 700). See Suvada v. White Motor Co., No. 38952, May 20, 1965. where
the court stated, "[f]ack of privity is not a defense in a tort action against the manufacturer."
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asserted,8 first came under assault in the food cases. 9 Of the numerous
arguments advanced for imposing liability, the theory acquiring the
widest acceptance was succinctly stated by the Texas court in Jacob E.
Decker & Sons v. Capps:10
Here the liability of the manufacturer and vendor (of food) is imposed by
operation of law as a matter of public policy for the protection of the public,
and is not dependent on any provision of the contract, either express or implied."
The present status of the law in an overhelming majority of jurisdictions
12
does not require privity in food cases.
The extension of the manufacturer's liability to cases other than food
14
followed, 13 and the holding in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.
provided the impetus for discarding the requirement of privity in nonfood cases. 15 The jurisdictions that rejected the privity requirement imposed strict liability on the theory of breach of implied warranty. 16 With
8 See Davidson v. Nichols, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 514 (1866), where the court stated:
"Privity of contract is an essential element in the maintenance of an action founded
on a breach of contract. When this does not exist, no action ex contractu can exist."
(Id. at 517).
9 For various theories advanced by the courts to circumvent the privity barrier, see
Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1897) (public safety); Coca Cola Bottling
Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927) (product carries a warranty which
runs with the title); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913) (demands of social justice); Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo.
App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (1936) (sale by dealer carried an assignment of his warranty
from the manufacturer); Ward Packing Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E.
557 (1928) (third party beneficiary). See generally, Gilliam, Products Liability in a
Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. 119 (1957), wherein the writer cites 29 different theories
used by the courts to evade the privity requirement.
10 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828, 142 A.L.R. 1479 (1942).
11 Id. at 617, 164 S.W.2d at 831-2, 142 A.L.R. at 1485.
12 See generally Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
13 See Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90
N.W.2d 873 (1958). Supra note 12, wherein Dean Prosser credits this case as the start
of the beginning of the change to strict liability.
14 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
15 Id. at 383, 161 A.2d at 83, wherein the court, after noting that most of the decisions where lack of privity has not been permitted to interfere with recovery have
involved food, stated: "We see no rational doctrinal basis for differentiating between
a fly in a bottle of beverage and a defective automobile. The unwholesome beverage
may bring illness to one person, the defective car, with its great potentiality for harm
to the driver, occupants and others, demands even less adherence to the narrow barrier of privity."
16 See, e.g., Putnam v. Erie City Manufacturing Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964);
Deveny v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Chapman v. Brown,
198 F. Supp. 78 aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders &
Masonry Supply, Inc., supra note 13; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191
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.1

the advent of Greenman v. Yuba Po'wer Products, Inc.,17 warranty concepts were questioned as to their necessity in establishing liability.
In the Greenman case, the California Supreme Court broke away from
warranty concepts and held the manufacturer of a defective power tool,
bought by plaintiff's wife from a retailer, liable to the plaintiff for resulting injuries caused by using the tool upon the theory of strict liability in
tort.1 8 Justice Traynor, speaking for the court, stated:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of
an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff,
the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law (citations) and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its
own responsibility for defective products (citations) make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of
strict liability in tort. 19
a
The court's holding indicates that there is no necessity for establishing
20
breach of warranty to find strict liability without negligence.
The Suvada decision ratified the holding of the Greenman decision
that ".

.

. the manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he

places on the market . . . proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being."12' Realizing that the Illinois Appellate Court had imposed
strict liability upon the theory of breach of implied warranty, as in
Henningsen22 and Goldberg,28 the Illinois Supreme Court's holding that
the defendants were strictly liable in tort made it unnecessary for the high
court to decide what effect section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial
Code has on an action for breach of an implied warranty.24 Re-affirming
N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). Contra, Schultz v. Tecumsech Products, 310 F.2d
426 (6th Cir. 1962); Long v. Flannigan Warehouse Co., 382 P.2d 399 (Nev. 1963).
See generally, FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODuCTs LIABILITY § 16-16A, at 357-442 (1963)
for a complete listing of all the jurisdictions going beyond the food products cases in
finding manufacturers liable without fault.
17 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
18 bid. See also, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring opinion).
19 Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901.
20 See generally, Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers 50 A.B.A.J. 446 (1964).
21 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1963).
See also, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964), which
cites the Greenman case as precedent.
22 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 14.
23 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., supra note 16.
24 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-318 (1963) which provides: "A seller's warranty whether
express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household
of his buyer, or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such per-
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the rule that privity is no longer necessary where the basis of the act is
negligence, 25 the court approves the extension of the Greenman rule, and
26
states, "... . today, negligence is no longer necessary."
The resulting liability established by Suvada does not infer that the
manufacturer is an absolute insurer, since the plaintiff must trace his injury to a defective condition of the product, and such defective condition
must be unreasonably dangerous and exist when the product leaves the
manufacturer's control. 27 The responsibility for a user's injury and subsequent loss from a dangerous and defective product is thrust upon the
manufacturer rather than upon the consumer even under circumstances
where the producer is not negligent in manufacturing the item.
Coinciding with these approaches on strict tort liability, is section 402A
of the American Law Institute's revised Restatement of the Law of Torts,
which states:
See. 402A: Special Liability of Seller of Products for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer.
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to liability for
phyical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business
of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to reach the user or consumer in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies, although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
from or entered
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
28
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Dean Prosser, the Reporter for the Restatement, is cited as saying that this
section "is the law of the immediate future ... and with the exception of
the changes in the law with respect to prenatal injuries, this is the most
radical and spectacular development in tort law during this century. "29
son may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this Section." Comment 3 to section 2-318 indicates that it is neutral and not intended to

enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the manufacturer's warranties
which are given to his dealers extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
25 See Carter v. Yardley &Co., supra note 7.
26 Suvada v. White Motor Co., No. 38952, May 20, 1965.
27 Ibid. See generally, James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable
Without Negligence? 24

TENN.

28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

L. REV. 923, 927, (1957).
§ 402A (1964).

TORTS

29 Putnam v. Erie City Manufacturing Co., 338 F.2d 911, 919 (5th Cir. 1964).
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There are five reasons advanced for adopting strict tort liability. 30 First,
public policy demands that maximum protection be given consumers
against dangerous defects in products. 8 1 Second, manufacturers can best
32
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products.
Third, the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. 83 Fourth, the retailer is
but a conduit, through whom the product is sold, and when such product
leads to disaster, the manufacturer should not be permitted to avoid responsibility by saying he has made no contract with the consumer.8 4 And
fifth, it is already possible to enforce strict liability by resorting to a series
of actions where the retailer is first held liable and then indemnity is
sought against the manufacturer. This is an expensive, time-consuming
and wasteful process.3 5
Presently, the concept of strict tort liability has been established in only
two states-California and Illinois. Other jurisdictions have maintained that
liability is predicated upon warranty and have eluded the privity requirement in one way or another. However, as Dean Prosser suggests, "[i]f
there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability in tort,
declared outright, without an illusory contract mask."36
Careful analysis reveals that there are now four forms of action available
to persons injured by reasons of defects in products; negligence, breach
of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness, or strict liability in tort.37 All of these actions may co-exist with
each other, and, as pertaining to pleadings, a plaintiff may find certain
advantages in each of them.
It is important to note that strict liability in tort requires only that the
plaintiff's injury "resulted from a condition of the product, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one and that the condition existed
at the time it left the manufacturer's control." 3 8 This required burden
contains the least pitfalls for the plaintiff. There is no requirement that
30 See generally Note, 14 DE PAUL L. REv. 488 (1965), wherein the writer cites arguments supporting the imposition of strict liability and arguments contrary to such
imposition.
31 See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, supra note 18.
32 See generally, James, supra note 27.
33 Ibid. See also, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra note 17.
34 See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, S 97, p. 673 (3rd ed. 1964).
35Ibid.
36 See Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 3 at 1134.
37 Address by Mr. Leonard Ring, noted Chicago attorney, The Annual Meeting,
Illinois State Bar Association, June 16, 1965, "Products Without Privity."
38 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I11.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
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plaintiff predicate liability on the theory of breach of warranty in order
to impose strict liability on the manufacturer. Thus, the assault upon the
citadel continues, and one can anticipate that other jurisditcions will follow
the precedent set out by Greenman and Suvada. Strict tort liability is a
revolutionary concept and surely is "the law of the immediate future."3 9
Robert Breakstone
39 Putnam v. Erie City Manufacturing Co., supra note 29.

TRUSTS-TOTTEN TRUST-INITIAL ILLINOIS
RECOGNITION
For a number of years, the decedent, Antonio Petralia, was the sole
owner of a savings account in his own name at the First National Bank
of Chicago. On November 8, 1948, he closed this account and transferred
all funds therein to an account in his own name as Trustee for his daughter, Dominica DiMaggio. 1 From the time the account was opened to the

date of his death, Antonio Petralia had, and exercised, the power to make
deposits and withdrawals from the account. At the death of Antonio
Petralia, the beneficiary of the trust instituted a citation proceeding
against the administrator of the estate, claiming title to the account. The
probate court entered a decree in favor of the beneficiary, and it was
affirmed by the appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
decree on the grounds that a valid and enforceable inter vivos trust was
created since the beneficiary had acquired a present interest during the
lifetime of the decedent. In re Petralia,32 111. 2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 1 (1965).
This decision marks the first judicial recognition of the tentative, or
"Totten" Trust, in Illinois. A tentative trust was first defined in New
York 2 and is now incorporated in the Restatement of Trusts.3 This note
I Signature card showed the words "Tony Petralia, Trustee" on the front, and on
the reverse side the following language: "All the deposits in this account are made
for the benefit of Domenica DiMaggio to whom or to whose legal representative said
deposits or any part thereof together with the interest thereon, may be paid in the
event of the death of the undersigned trustee."
21n re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904): "A savings bank trust
is a deposit by one person of his in his own name as trustee for another. Such a deposit,

standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the de-

positor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery
of the pass book or notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the

beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance,
the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand
at the death of the depositor."
3 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, §58 (2d ed. 1958).

